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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal odyssey of John Demjanjuk began in 1977 when the Department
of Justice initiated denaturalization proceedings based on allegations that
Demjanjuk had illegally secured United States citizenship by concealing his
service with the German S.S.1 Following entry of denaturalization and
extradition orders in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio, Demjanjuk was extradited to Israel where he was convicted of war
crimes that occurred at Nazi death camps.2 In 1992, while Demjanjuk was in
Israel awaiting the appeal of his conviction, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit took the unprecedented step of re-opening a prior habeas
1United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1981), afd, 680
F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
2 Ken Myers, Under the Demjanjuk Spotlight, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 30, 1993, at 31.
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proceeding.3 Six years earlier the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the district court's
denial of Demjanjuk's petition for habeas relief from the extradition order.4
Reopening the case has been described as an "extraordinary step"5 and an
"unprecedented move that raised eyebrows in the legal community."6 A
commentary published in the Wall Street Journal, described the court's action
as "lawless", "unprecedented and overreaching." 7 The United States
Department of Justice maintained that the Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to
reopen the habeas corpus proceeding.8 Petitions were filed by two Justice
Department attorneys requesting the United States Supreme Court to issue a
writ of mandamus directing the Sixth Circuit to cease proceedings 9 or to take
a more appropriate course of action.10 In light of the criticism that the Sixth
Circuit has received, this note will examine the authority of the court to reopen
the Demjanjuk case in June, 1992.
The note will begin by outlining the legal history of the Demjanjuk case,
culminating in the decision of the Sixth Circuit to reopen the habeas corpus
action in response to the court's concern that Justice Department attorneys
3Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435 (6th Cir. June 5, 1992)(reopening case on
motion of the court), reprinted in 10 F.3d 338, 356 app. (6th Cir. 1993).
4 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986), vacated by, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295 (1994).
5 Mark Hansen, Extradition Reopened, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 33.
6 Myers, supra note 2, at 31.
7 Alan M. Dershowitz, On Demjanjuk, Unprecedented Lawlessness, WALL ST. J., Aug.
5, 1993, at A12.
8 Second Brief for Respondents, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435 at 3 (6th Cir.
Aug. 4, 1992).
9 Moscowitz v. Merritt, No. 92-1447 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1993)(petition for a writ of
prohibition or mandamus). Norman A. Moscowitz was an attorney in the Office of
Special Investigations, a unit within the Department of Justice, and represented the
government in Demjanjuk's denaturalization proceedings. The questions presented in
the petition for the writ of mandamus included: whether the Sixth Circuit had
jurisdiction to reopen the extradition after Demjanjuk had been extradited to Israel,
whether the Sixth Circuit abused its judicial power by failing to remand the proceeding
to the district court, whether the Sixth Circuit improperly delegated the proceedings to
a Special Master and whether the allegations of non-disclosure met the legal standard
for fraud upon the court. On May 25, 1993, the Supreme Court denied review without
comment.
1OParker v. Merritt, No. 92-1350 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1993)(petition for a writ of prohibition
or mandamus). George L. Parker was an attorney in the Office of Special Investigations
and worked on the Demjanjuk case prior to the denaturalization trial. The questions
presented in Parker's petition for writ of mandamus were whether the appointment of
a Special Master in the reopening of Demjanjukv. Petrovskywa san inappropriate exercise
of the inherent power of the Sixth Circuit and whether the Sixth Circuit should have
remanded the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
where the underlying proceedings had been heard. The Supreme Court denied review




failed to disclose relevant information during earlier proceedings. Parts III and
IV of the note discuss why the authorities cited by the Sixth Circuit, Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6),
did not give the appellate court authority to reopen the Demjanjuk habeas
corpus proceeding in 1992. Part V addresses the scope of a federal court's
inherent power, and this note concludes that the acts of the Justice Department
attorneys did not warrant the court's reopening of the case under its inherent
power to protect the court from fraud.
II. LEGAL HISTORY OF THE DEMJANJUK CASE
John Demjanjuk, a native of the Ukraine, entered the United States in 1952
under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and became a United States citizen in
1958.11 In 1977, the Department of Justice filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio seeking to revoke Demjanjuk's
certificate of naturalization.12 After entering extensive findings of fact, the
district court revoked Demjanjuk's naturalization in 1981 and vacated the order
admitting him to United States citizenship. 13 On October 31, 1983, Israel filed
a request with the U.S. State Department for Demjanjuk's extradition to face
charges of murder at Nazi death camps.14 Following an evidentiary hearing,
the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio entered an order in 1985
certifying that Demjanjuk was subject to extradition.15
11United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1981), affd, 680
F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
12 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338,370 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295
(1994).
13 Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1386. The court found that Demjanjuk made material
misrepresentations on his visa application by failing to disclose that he served in the
German SS atTrawniki, a camp run by the German SS in order to train guards for work
at concentration camps, and at Treblinka, an extermination camp. Id. at 1381-82. A
person who had served as a concentration camp guard could not obtain a U.S. visa, even
if the service was involuntary. Id. at 1381. Demjanjuk, a Ukrainian, was conscripted into
the Russian army in 1940; he was subsequently captured by the Germans. Id. at 1363-64.
Russian P.O.W.s were used by the Germans to staff concentration camps. Id. at 1365.
141n re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544,546 (N.D. Ohio 1985). Following
the denaturalization proceedings the United States had initiated deportation
proceedings. In re Demjanjuk, No. A8 237 417 (Immigration Court May 23, 1984), affd,
(B.I.A. Feb. 14, 1985), affd, 767 F.2d 922 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1034 (1985).
15In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 571. The extradition warrant from
the State of Israel charged Demjanjuk with the crime of murderingJews under the Nazis
and Nazis Collaborators Law of Israel. Id. at 546. The district court examined eyewitness
affidavits of Treblinka concentration camp survivors who identified John Demjanjuk
from photographs as a guard at the camp. The court found that the eyewitness testimony
of the survivors was sufficient to establish probable cause that John Demjanjuk was the
man sought by Israel in its extradition warrant. Id. at 552.
1994]
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There is no direct appeal from an order certifying extradition; the only means
to obtain a review is through a collateral habeas corpus proceeding. 16
Demjanjuk filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court
seeking to block his extradition. The district court denied the writ.17 In 1985,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (panel consisting of Judges Pierce
Lively, Damon J. Keith and Gilbert S. Merritt), in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,
affirmed denial of the writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court
properly certified to the Secretary of State that Demjanjuk was subject to
extradition to Israel.18 The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 19
The United States extradited John Demjanjuk to Israel in February, 1986. In
April 1988, an Israeli Court found Demjanjuk guilty of war crimes, concluding
that Demjanjuk was the Nazi gas chamber operator, Ivan the Terrible.
Demjanjuk appealed this conviction, which carried a death sentence, to the
Supreme Court of Israel.20 On April 8, 1988, Demjanjuk filed an action in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio requesting relief from
previous judgments on the basis that the United States had fraudulently
withheld evidence during the previous proceedings. 21
16 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571,576 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986), vacated, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295 (1994).
17Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 612 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ohio), affd, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986), vacated, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 295 (1994). Joseph Petrovsky was the warden of the Federal Prison Medical
Facility in Springfield, Missouri where Demjanjuk was incarcerated at the time that the
habeas petition was filed. Moscowitz v. Merritt, No. 92-1447 at 8 (U.S. Mar. 2,
1993)(petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus). A writ of habeas corpus is filed
against the person who has custody of the petitioner. 39A CJ.S. Habeas Corpus § 164
(1976).
18 Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 584.
19Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia also denied a writ of habeas corpus filed by Demjanjuk.
Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
20Michael Parks, Accused 'Ivan the Terrible' to Learn His Fate Today, L.A. TIMES, July
29,1993, at 10.
21Demjanjuk v. United States, No. 88-0864 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 8, 1988)(complaint for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief). Cases are assigned randomly in this district
court and the case was not assigned to the Judge who had heard the denaturalization
and extradition cases. The complaint filed by Demjanjuk alleged that the United States
had evidence indicating that Demjanjuk was not Ivan the Terrible prior to 1981 and that
the United States withheld this evidence with the intent of preventing Demjanjuk from
formulating a defense. Id. at 7,8. The complaint states that these acts and others denied
Demjanjuk his right to due process under the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 29.
The Justice Department filed a motion to dismiss and no action was taken by the
court until January 28, 1992 when the case was referred to a magistrate judge for
recommendation for disposition. A pre-trial conference was held on March 24,1992. On
June 24, 1992 Demjanjuk filed a motion to stay proceedings in the case pending the
appellate decision in Demjanjuk v. Petrovksy which had been reopened by the Sixth
Circuit on June 5, 1992. See Civil Docket for Case #88-CV-864, United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio (Filed April 8, 1988). Following a joint motion
[Vol. 42:737
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While Mr. Demjanjuk was in Israel awaiting the Israeli Supreme Court's
review of his conviction, new evidence from the rapidly disintegrating Soviet
Union began to surface that suggested that another Ukrainian, Ivan
Marchenko, may have been the notorious Ivan at the Treblinka death camp.22
With Mr. Demjanjuk extradited to Israel and his appeal being considered by
the Supreme Court of Israel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit issued its order of June 5, 1992, reopening, sua sponte, the case of
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky.23 The order was issued by the same panel of judges that
heard the case in 1985. The order states:
Our previous study of the record and numerous recent press reports
and articles in the United States indicate that the extradition warrant
by the Executive Branch may have been improvidently issued because
it was based on erroneous information. Consideration should be given
to its validity and to whether this court's refusal to grant the petition
for Wvrit of habeas corpus was erroneous.
24
The Sixth Circuit ordered the United States to file a brief describing any
evidence within its possession that would tend to show that John Demjanjuk
was not "Ivan the Terrible" and to include a statement indicating when agents
of the United States first learned of this evidence.25
As authority for reopening the case, the Sixth Circuit cited Rule 40 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which pertains to the rehearing of causes
previously heard, and Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which pertains to relief from judgments previously entered.26 In a subsequent
order entered on August 17, 1992, the court, responding to the Justice
Department's assertion that the court lacked jurisdiction to reopen the case,
stated it was proceeding under "its inherent power to grant relief, for
'after-discovered fraud' from an earlier judgment'regardless of the term of [its]
entry'."2 7
by plaintiffs and defendants and recommendation of the magistrate judge to stay the
proceedings, the district court granted the motion and closed the case subject to
reopening by any party. Demjanjuk v. United States, No. 88-CV-0864 (N.D. Ohio Feb.
3, 1993).
22Myers, supra note 2, at 31.
23Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435 (6th Cir. June 5, 1992)(reopening case on
motion of the court), reprinted in 10 F.3d 338, 356 app. (6th Cir. 1993).
241d. at 356, 357.
251d. at 357. The court also ordered the parties to file simultaneous briefs stating their
position on whether the court should reconsider the earlier denial of habeas corpus relief
to Mr. Demjanjuk and whether the court should remand the case to the district court.
Id.
261d. at 357.
27Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435, at 2 (6th Cir. Aug. 17,1992)(order appointing
a Special Master to conduct an inquiry into attorney misconduct in the previous
proceedings), reprin ted in 10 F.3d 338,357 app. (6th Cir. 1993). In the Sixth Circuit's order,
1994]
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III. AUTHORniY TO REOPEN AN APPELLATE MANDATE
A. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40
The Sixth Circuit reopened the Demjanjuk habeas corpus proceeding on its
own motion citing authority pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
40.28 Rule 40 states:
A petition for rehearing may be filed within 14 days after entry of
judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order or by local
rule. The petition shall state with particularity the points of law or fact
which in the opinion of the petitioner the court has overlooked or
misapprehended and shall contain such arument in support of the
petition as the petitioner desires to present.
The local rule of the Sixth Circuit does not modify the fourteen day time
period.30
The action taken by the Sixth Circuit does not fall within the parameters of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40. A petition was not filed by a party; the
court reopened the case on its own motion. Rather than fourteen days after
entry of judgment, the Sixth Circuit acted six years after it had entered its
judgment. The impetus for the Sixth Circuit's reopening of the case was not
that the court had overlooked or misapprehended law or fact, but that the court
issued November, 1993, that overturned the extradition proceedings, the court also cited
authority for reopening the habea s proceeding under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338,356 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295 (1994).
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 21(c) provides for the use of extraordinary
writs by the appellate courts. The notes of the advisory committee state that subdivision
(c) authorizes the use of the writs "which may be issued under the authority of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651." "The All Writs Act is a residual source of authority to issue writs which are not
otherwise covered by statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue
at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling". Pennsylvania
Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshall Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 abolishes the writs pertaining to relief from a
final judgment. The advisory notes to Rule 60 state that "[ilt is obvious that the rules
should be complete in this respect and define the practice with respect to any existing
rights or remedies to obtain relief from final judgments." Thus the writs pertaining to
relief from final judgment have been abolished by the civil rules, specifically Rule 60,
and relief from a final judgment would not be available under authority of the All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Although the All Writs Act "empowers federal courts to fashion
extraordinary remedies when the need arises, it does not authorize them to issue ad hoc
writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less
appropriate." Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, 474 U.S. at 43.
2 8 Demjanjuk, No. 85-3435, at 1 (June 5,1992), reprinted in 10 F.3d at 357 app. 1 (1993).
2 9FED. R. App. P. 40.
3 0
"A petition must be filed within (14) days of the date of the opinion." Internal
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was concerned that a party had withheld evidence.31 Further, the mandate of
the court in Deinjanjuk v. Petrovsky issued in 1985.32 The issuance of the mandate
formally ended the jurisdiction of the appellate court.33
In considering a petition for rehearing submitted by a party, the Sixth Circuit
required compliance with the fourteen day time period. In Libbey-Owens-Ford
Co. v. Blue Cross, the court refused to consider a petition filed twelve days late,
holding that failure to file within fourteen days makes a rehearing
"impossible".34 The court further stated that "[b]ecause the motion was filed in
this case after the fourteen-day period, this court is divested of further appellate
jurisdiction."35 It is incongruous that the court would allow its own motion to
rehear a case made six years after judgment had been entered, while invoking
the fourteen day rule to prohibit rehearing a case where a party had filed its
petition only twelve days late.
To be granted a rehearing, the petitioner must convince the court that it
overlooked or misapprehended a point of law or fact.36 The point overlooked
must be one that is in the record; facts beyond the record cannot be
introduced.37 The Sixth Circuit has denied a petition for rehearing where the
31Demjanjuk, No. 85-3435, at 2 June 5,1992), reprinted in 10 F.3d at 357 app. 1 (1993).
32A certified copy of the judgment and a copy of the opinion of the court constitute
an appellate mandate. The mandate of the court is issued twenty-one days after the entry
of judgment. A timely petition for rehearing will stay the mandate until decision on the
petition is reached. If the petition is denied, the mandate will issue seven days after entry
of the order denying the petition. The time for issuance of the mandate can be enlarged
or shortened by order. FED. R. App. P. 41. Since a petition for rehearing was not granted
and the time for filing was not extended, the appellate mandate in Demjanjukv. Petrovsky
issued within twenty-one days of the judgment in 1985.
33 See Johnson v. Bechtel Assocs. Professional Corp., 801 F.2d 412,415 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Following issuance of the mandate, jurisdiction returns to the court to which the
mandate is directed. Id. In Demjanjuk, jurisdiction returned to the District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio.
34 Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 982 F.2d 1031,
1036 (6th Cir. 1993)(stating thatfailure to file a requestfora rehearing within the fourteen
day period makes "review of the decision impossible without prior leave of court"), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 72 (1993).
351d.
36 FED. R. App. P. 40. The operating rules of the Sixth Circuit state "[a] petition for
rehearing is intended to bring to the attention of the panel claimed error of fact or law
in the opinion." Internal Operating Procedures of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, Chapter 20.2 (1991).
37 United States v. Vasquez, 985 F.2d 491, 497 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Foster v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp., 773 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1985)(rehearing is allowed where
court finds petitioner properly pointed out that the court failed to address an issue
legitimately raised in the briefs). But see Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1987)(holding
that a new argument presented by the government fell within the exception to the rule
prohibiting the hearing of new arguments on a petition for rehearing); United States v.
Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. 1984)(holding that a new issuecan beconsidered on rehearing
19941
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court found that the issues raised in the petition for rehearing had been fully
considered, 38 but granting rehearing where the petitioner convinced the court
that it may have ignored relevant issues brought up during the trial.39
In reopening Demjanjuk, the Sixth Circuit did not consider whether it
misapprehended a point of law or fact raised in the record. Instead, the court's
decision to reopen the case resulted from the court's consideration of
information outside the record that came to its attention six years after it had
issued its mandate.40 The Sixth Circuit cited to authority for reopening
Demjanjuk under Rule 40; however, this rule does not apply in the
circumstances surrounding Demjanjuk because the requirements of filing a
petition within fourteen days and the misapprehension by the court of law or
facts in the record were not satisfied.
B. Recall of an Appellate Mandate
Although Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 does not apply to the
circumstances of Demjanjuk, the court may have relied on the rule because it is
the only appellate rule that pertains to the reconsideration of a case. Expanding
their authority beyond the appellate rules, circuit courts have developed a
common law doctrine allowing for the recall of an appellate mandate. "[C]ourts
of appeals have asserted the power (analogous to that conferred on the district
courts by Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)) to recall a mandate, in effect reopening the case,
without limit of time, although only in exceptional circumstances."4 1 The
appellate courts have asserted the power to recall an appellate mandate in
order to fill in a perceived gap in the federal rules.42 The exercise of the power
to recall an appellate mandate is at the discretion of the court.43
where an intervening Supreme Court decision makes the previously untenable issue a
plausible one).
3 8 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 11 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1993).
3 9Coal Resources, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 756 F.2d 443,445 (6th Cir. 1985).
In a breach of contract case, the court granted a petition for rehearing where the party
argued that the panel ignored a stipulation at trial regarding the burden of proof.
4ODemjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435 (6th Cir. June 5, 1992)(reopening case on
motion of the court), reprinted in 10 F.3d 338, 356 app. (6th Cir. 1993). The court refers to
"numerous recent press reports and articles in the United States" that indicate that the
extradition warrant for Demjanjuk was "improvidently issued because it was based on
erroneous information." Id. at 357.
41 patterson v. Crabb, 904 F.2d 1179, 1180 (7th Cir. 1990)(citing Johnson v. Bechtel
Assocs. Professional Corp., 801 F.2d 412,446 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(per curiam); see also Zipfel
v. Halliburton Co., 861 F.2d 565,567(9th Cir. 1988), vacating 832 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987)
(vacating the decision after a recall of the first appellate mandate);American Iron & Steel
Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 593-595 (3d Cir. 1977)(holding that appellate mandate could
be recalled where there were differences between the court's decision and a recent
opinion of the Supreme Court), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978).
42 Patterson, 904 F.2d at 1180 (citing to United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 878 (7th
Cir. 1984)). In Patterson, the appellant never obtained a hearing on his appeal due to
[Vol. 42:737
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Two circumstances in which appellate mandates have been recalled are
when a Supreme Court decision has changed the controlling law or when the
appellate court has made a clerical or procedural error. The Ninth Circuit in
Zipfel v. Halliburton44 recalled its appellate mandate when a subsequent
Supreme Court decision had significantly differed from the holding of the
appellate court so that adherence to the appellate decision would be unjust and
create diverse results between litigants.45 The Seventh Circuit has recalled a
mandate in a case of judicial error because the court denied an appeal on the
mistaken belief that the lower court had not entered a final judgment.46 The
Sixth Circuit recalled a mandate when the court erred in enforcing a bargaining
order on the basis that an employee engaged in labor organizing had been
wrongfully discharged, when, however, the appellate court had actually
overturned the finding of wrongful discharge.47
The District of Columbia Circuit in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC48
analyzed the power to recall an appellate mandate, stating that the clearest
reason to recall an appellate mandate is to correct clerical mistakes. Of
relevance to the Demjanjuk case, the court in Greater Boston cited the "firmly
established" doctrine that gives a court the power to set aside an appellate
mandate for fraud on the court.49 Although an appellate court can reopen a
case for fraud on the court, this occurs only in the limited circumstances in
which the court itself has been defrauded, which will be discussed in Section
V.
Federal appellate courts have recognized that the recall of an appellate
mandate is an exceptional remedy that should be limited. "If justice is to be
served, there must at some point be an end to litigation; on that account, the
power to recall mandates should be exercised sparingly."50 The court in Greater
Boston states:
judicial error; therefore Judge Richard A. Posner, writing for the 7th Circuit, found that
the exercise of the power to recall an appellant mandate was appropriate. Id. at 1180.
43 Zipfel, 861 F.2d at 567.
44861 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1988).
4SZipfel, 861 F.2d at 567.
46 Patterson v. Crabb, 904 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1990).
47A to Z Portion Meats v. NLRB, 643 F.2d 390, 391 (6th Cir. 1980).
48463 F.2d 268, 277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). The court
stated that since the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not include a provision
pertaining to the recall of an appellate mandate, the court would have to look to general
doctrine. Id. The court then surveyed cases that have recalled an appellate mandate. In
addition to the reasons cited in the text, appellate mandates have been recalled to avoid
differences in results of cases pending at the same time and to revise an unintended
instruction to the trial court that would result in injustice. Id. at 278, 279.
4 91d. at 277.
5OLever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330,1332 (D.C. Cir. 1993); seea/soJohnson
v. Bechtel Assocs. Professional Corp., 801 F.2d 412, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(finding that
1994]
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While there is a doctrine for recall of mandate broadly rooted in a
showing of "good cause" and the need to "prevent injustice", the
"power to recall mandates should be exercised sparingly" and is not to
be availed of freely as a basis for granting rehearings out of time for
the purpose of changing decisions even assuming the court becomes
doubtful of the wisdom of the decision that has been entered and
become final.
51
Courts are reluctant to use the extraordinary procedure of recalling a mandate
when a "normal process" is available.5 2
While precedent exists for recalling an appellate mandate, the wisdom of
such a rule has been questioned. The First Circuit in Boston and Maine Corp. v.
Town of Hampton53 was "troubled" by the implications of asserting an inherent
authority to recall a mandate. The court questioned:
What, for example, would be the effect on jurisdiction in the district
court, after a mandate is recalled and then reissued? And what
reasoned explanation would justify the divergence between fixed time
limits on the district court's ability to amend a judgment under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60 and the absence of like time limits on the suggested inherent
authority of the appellate courts to recall a mandate, even if acting on
precisely the same grounds? Would vesting such exceptional power
solely in courts of appeal create an area of essentially original, rather
than appellate jurisdiction in courts of appeal over closed cases?.: 4
The First Circuit was further concerned that continuing the practice of recalling
an appellate mandate "risks extending indefinitely the authority of the court
over closed cases."55
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not include a rule authorizing
the reopening of judgments other than Rule 40, with its narrow fourteen day
time period. The absence of a rule similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60
suggests that the drafters of the rules did not intend that appellate courts
reopen judgments. After the issuance of the appellate mandate, jurisdiction
returns to the district court. Circumstances such as fraud, newly discovered
evidence or mistake, as specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
should be considered by the district court.
where in the unusual procedural posture of the case, the normal process of appeal was
available, the court would not resort to recalling the mandate).
51 Greater Boston, 463 F.2d at277 (quoting Estate of Iverson v. Commissioner, 257 F.2d
408, 409 (8th Cir. 1958).
52Johnson, 801 F.2d at 416.
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In the circumstances of Demjanjuk, extending appellate jurisdiction over a
case for six years after entry of judgment stretches the limited concept, not
recognized in the appellate rules, that a mandate can be recalled. Further, the
circumstances of Demjanjuk do not involve the limited situations under which
an appellate mandate has been recalled such as procedural or clerical error, or
a change in the controlling law.
IV. AUTHORITY TO REOPEN UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b)(6)
The Sixth Circuit cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) as authority
to reopen Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky.56 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by
their own terms, are intended to apply only to the district courts.57 Appellate
courts, however, have applied the policies underlying the Rules to resolve
procedural issues.58 Rule 60 pertains to the relief that a party may obtain from
a judgment. The drafters of Rule 60 attempted to balance the interest in the
finality of judgments against the competing interest in assuring justice.59 As
will be discussed below, the policy behind Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(6) precludes its use in the circumstances of Demjanjuk and therefore the
rule was improperly relied upon by the Sixth Circuit.
Rule 60(b) specifies several circumstances in which relief from a judgment
is appropriate. The first five clauses provide relief from a final judgment on
motion for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud,
56Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435, at 1 (6th Cir. June 5,1992)(reopening case on
motion of the court), reprinted in 10 F.3d 338, 357 app. (6th Cir. 1993).
57The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that "[t]hese rules govern the procedure
in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as
cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81." FED. R.
Civ. P. 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(2) states that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are applicable to proceedings for habeas corpus. Appeal in habeas corpus
cases is governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4268 (1988).
58 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply only in federal district courts,
the policies underlying the rules may be applied by an appellate court. International
Union, United Auto., Aerospace and AgriculturalImplement Workers of Am. AFL-CIO,
Local 283, v. Schofield, 382 U.S. 205, 217 (1965); see also Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co., 296 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961)(appellate court
corrects clerical mistake citing FED. R. Civ. P. 60(a)); Hines v. Royal Indemnity Co., 253
F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1958)(although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the
district courts and not to the appellate courts, the rules have been applied by analogy
by the appellate courts). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings relative to Perl, 838 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1988)(where the court refused to apply Rule 11 because the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are applied only in the district courts).
5911 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2851 (1973).
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misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged.
60
Clause six is a residual clause that includes "any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment."61 Rule 60(b) also includes two savings
clauses. The first provides for relief by an independent action, and the second
allows a judgment to be set aside for fraud upon the court.62
Rule 60 provides that a motion for relief from a judgment shall be made
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year
after thejudgment, order or proceeding was entered. 63 In reopening Demjanjuk,
the Sixth Circuit acted in response to newly discovered evidence and concern
that fraud had occurred during the earlier proceedings. 64 Although these
circumstances are covered by 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(3), those rules could not be
used by the court because they must be initiated by motion within one year of
entry of the judgment. Since the Sixth Circuit was initiating its proceeding in
1992, six years after entering its judgment denying habeas relief in 1985, the
court looked to the residual clause, 60(b)(6), which is not subject to the one year
time limit.
Although a residual clause, 60(b)(6) has a significant limitation to its use; the
motion must be based on "any other reason" than those listed in clauses (1)
through (5).65 The Supreme Court in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition
Corp.66 stated that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion may be granted "provided that the
motion is made within a reasonable time and is not premised on one of the
grounds for relief enumerated in clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5)."67 This limitation




64 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435 (6th Cir. June 5, 1992)(reopening case on
motion of the court), reprinted in 10 F.3d 338, 357 app. (6th Cir. 1993). In the June 5th
order the court stated that recent press reports (The press was reporting new
information obtained from the Soviet Union concerning the identity of Ivan the Terrible.
See supra note 2.) indicated to the court that the extradition warrant executed by the
Executive Branch may have been "improvidently" issued. A subsequent order, August
17, 1992, stated that the question for the court was whether fraud upon the court had
misled the court into allowing Demjanjuk to be extradited. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No.
85-3435, at 1 (6th Cir. August 17, 1992)(order appointing a Special Master), reprinted in
10 F.3d 338,357 app. (6th Cir. 1993).
65FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); 7JAMEs W. MOOREETAL., MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.27[1]
(2d ed. 1993).
66486 U.S. 847 (1988).
671d. at 863; see also Wilson v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869, 871 (5th
Cir.)(stating that relief cannot be granted under 60(b)(6) where, but for the rule's time
limit, relief could be granted under another subsection of rule 60(b)), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 977 (1989); Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Systems, Inc., 803 F.2d
(Vol. 42:737
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prevents the use of clause (6), which only requires filing within a reasonable
time, to circumvent the one year limitation imposed by the first three clauses.68
The Sixth Circuit has held that Rule 60(b)(6) can be applied only where there
is a ground for relief from a judgment that goes beyond those listed in clauses
(1) through (5).69 In Ollev. Henry & Wright Corporation,7 the Sixth Circuit stated,
'The difficulty in interpreting subsection (b)(6), and perhaps the reason for the
paucity of decisions in this area, arises from the fact that almost every
conceivable ground for relief is covered under the first three subsections of Rule
60(b)."71 The grounds for reopening Demjanjuk relied on by the Sixth Circuit,
the availability of new evidence and fraud by an adverse party, are included in
60(b)(2) and 60(b)(3). Motions for relief due to fraud and newly discovered
evidence, when brought more than one year after the entry of judgment, have
been denied as time-barred under 60(b)(2) or 60(b)(3) and unavailable under
60(b)(6), because the ground for the motion was stated in the other two
subsections of the rule.72
The purpose of incorporating a residual clause, such as 60(b)(6), in a rule is
to provide for unusual and exceptional circumstances that the drafters of the
1130, 1133 (11th Cir. 1986)(holding that relief cannot be granted under 60(b)(6) for any
reason that could be a basis for relief under 60(b)(1)); Corex Corp. v. United States, 638
F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1981)(stating that Rule 60(b)(6) and clauses (1) through (5) are
mutually exclusive and that a 60(b)(6) motion based on newly discovered evidence
would be reviewed as if it had been made under Rule 60(b)(2)).
6 801le v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 366 (6th Cir. 1990)(stating that there
must be extraordinary circumstances to bring a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) to "prevent
clause (6) from being used to circumvent the one-year limitations period that applies to
clause (1)"). Litigants may not invoke Rule (60)(b)(6) to avoid the time limits that areimposed by the other sections of Rule (60)(b). See Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Ruben, 957
F.2d 126,133 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 70 (1992).
69 Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1993); Mcdowell v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 931 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1991); Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.
1990).
70910 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1990).
711d. at 365.
72 Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
977 (1989). In a products liability action, the plaintiff requested that the court set aside
a judgment because the defendant had fraudulently concealed the time that he knew of
an asbestos hazard. The plaintiff's attempt to set aside the judgment under 60(b)(6) was
denied because the ground for relief, fraud, was covered by Rule 60(b)(3). Under Rule
60(b)(3), the motion was required to be brought within one year; In re Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co., 878F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1989)(motion for relief from
a judgment alleging fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in a Federal
Employees Liability Claim filed more than one year after judgment was time-barred by
Rule 60(b)(3) and unavailable under Rule 60(b)(6) because the ground for relief is foundin Rule 60(b)(3)); In re Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1006 (1989)(motion to set aside judgment for fraud filed one year after entry ofjudgment is time-barred, and the courtwould not apply 60(b) (6) because itwould negate
the purpose of 60(b)(3)'s time limit).
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rule did not anticipate. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), has been
applied to relieve a party of a judgment when the party's own attorney has
been guilty of misconduct in failing to appear at docket call resulting in
dismissal of the case.73 The rule has also been used to vacate an order
dismissing a case where a party repudiated the settlement agreement.74 These
are the types of unexpected situations which the residual clause is intended to
cover. Newly discovered evidence and fraud are anticipated occurrences which
were specifically included in Rule 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(3).
Further, Rule 60 states that relief under the rule is provided "on motion.''75
The Sixth Circuit, in considering a 60(b) motion, has stated, "[i]n no event may
the district court act sua sponte to grant relief from judgment. Rather, the
affected party must first make a motion for such relief. "76 The Sixth Circuit
reopened Demjanjuk on its own motion.77 Reopening the case on motion of the
court is contrary to both the rule and the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the
rule.
The Sixth Circuit's reliance on authority under Rule 60(b)(6) for reopening
Denjanjuk appears inappropriate. Applying the rule at a minimum deviates
from normal procedure in several ways. First, although there is precedent, use
of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure by an appellate court is unusual. Second,
if the rule is applied by the appellate court, it should adhere to the policy
established in the district courts for applying the rule. Clearly 60(b)(6) is to be
reserved for circumstances that are not covered by sections (1) through (5).
Finally, the Sixth Circuit disregarded its own construction of the rule that allows
an action to be initiated only on a party's motion.
73 Fuller v. Quire, 916 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1990). In Fuller, the court used Rule 60(b)(6)
to reinstate a case after an order dismissing the case had been entered. The court found
that the attorney's failure to arrive at court for the docket call should not relieve the
plaintiff of a cause of action where the plaintiff had been diligent in attempting to
discover the status of the case and the plaintiff lived at some distance from the court. Id.
74Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union 162,927 F.2d 609 (9th Cir.
1991). The court found the circumstances of repudiation of a settlement agreement
sufficiently extraordinary to vacate the previous judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).
75
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. FED. R.
Civ. P. 60(b).
76 Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.2d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 1993)(citing Eaton v. Jamrog, 984
F.2d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1993)). The Sixth Circuit in Eaton, stated "Rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ.
P. provides several specific situations in which a district court, 'on motion', may relieve
a party of a final judgment.. .[rule 60(b) explicitly requires a motion from the affected
party, and in this case the district court acted sua sponte." Id. at 762. The Sixth Circuit
found that the district court erred in acting sua sponte and dismissed the appeal. Id.
77 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435, at 1 (6th Cir. June 5,1992)(reopening case on
motion of the court), reprinted in 10 F.3d 338, 356 app. (6th Cir. 1993).
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V. AuTHORITY TO REOPEN UNDER THE INHERENT POWER TO SET ASIDE A
JUDGMENT FOR FRAUD ON THE COURT
A. The Court's Inherent Power
The Sixth Circuit rejected the Justice Department's contention that it did not
have authority to reopen its 1985 judgment denying habeas relief to Demjanjuk
by citing its "inherent power to grant relief for 'after-discovered fraud', from
an earlier judgment 'regardless of the term of [its] entry'."78 The concept of
inherent power is based on the principle of separation of powers. Courts exist
as independent entities and have an obligation to maintain themselves to
ensure that the judicial functions are carried out. Thus, they have an
independent, inherent power to assure that all expenses are paid and that
sufficient employees are hired.79
The Supreme Court in Chambers v. Nasco,80 discussed the scope of the
inherent power of federal courts. Chambers cited the inherent power of a federal
court to control admission to its bar and discipline attorneys, to punish for
contempt of court, to bar a disruptive criminal defendant from the courtroom,
to dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens and to dismiss a suit
for failure to prosecute.81 These are the basic powers that enable a court to
function. The Supreme Court in Link v. Wabash R.R.,82 described the inherent
powers as those "governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases."83
Chambers recognized that "the inherent power also allows a federal court to
vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon
the court",84 citing Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co.,85 which
involved bribery of a judge. The fraud on the court doctrine derives from the
78 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435, at 2 (6th Cir. Aug. 17,1992)(order appointing
a Special Master), reprinted in 10 F.3d 338,358 app. (6th Cir. 1993).
7 9 J1m R. CARRIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURT (1977).
80111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
8 iId. In Chambers the Supreme Court held that a federal court could use its inherent
power to impose sanctions for the bad faith conduct of a party. The district court had
imposed sanctions against Chambers requiring him to pay the entire amount of the
opposing party's litigation fees where Chambers had tried to deprive the court of
jurisdiction and obstructed, delayed and harassed his opponent. Id. at 2130, 2131. The
district court could sanction the behavior even if it was not covered by the rules on
sanctions as long as the inherent power was not used to circumvent the clear mandate
of the rule. Id. at 2136.
82370 U.S. 626 (1962).
8 31d. at 630-31.
8 4 Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2132.
85328 U.S. 575 (1946).
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court's inherent power because a court is unable to carry on its basic function
of adjudicating cases when a fraud, such as bribery of the judge, is perpetrated
on the court itself.
In its order of August 17, 1992, following reopening the Demjanjuk habeas
proceeding in June 1992, the Sixth Circuit stated that the "bedrock question" for
the court was whether the failure of Justice Department attorneys to disclose
exculpatory information indicating that Demjanjuk was not Ivan the Terrible
constituted fraud upon the court.86 The court appointed a Special Master to
investigate the fraud issue and to file a report with the court.87
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) Savings Clause
The inherent power of a court to grant relief from a judgment for fraud on
the court is recognized by the second savings clause of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b). Rule 60(b) includes two savings clauses in the phrase: "This
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding . .. or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court."88 The two actions are distinct and should
not be considered as one procedure to entertain an independent action for fraud
upon the court.89 Fraud upon the court is a distinct ground that is
distinguishable from fraud between the parties entitling relief under Rule
(60)(b)(3). 90 Fraud on the court goes beyond fraud between the parties and
involves a "direct assault on the integrity of the judicial process."91 While an
independent action can be based on fraud, it can also be based on accident,
mistake or any other equitable ground.92
The independent action refers to a proceeding for relief from a judgment filed
in a new or separate action, which may or may not be initiated in the court that
86 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435, at 1 (6th Cir. June 5,1992), reprinted in 10 F.3d
338,358 app. (6th Cir. 1993).
871d. at 2, reprinted in 10 F.3d at 359.
88 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
89 Both treatises, WRIGHT & MILLER and MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, separate the
clause into two distinct grounds for granting relief from a judgment. 7JAMES W. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.36 (Independent Action in Equity), 60.33
(Power to Set Aside a Judgment for Fraud Upon the Court) (2d ed. 1993); 11 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2868
(Independent Action for Relief), § 2870 (Fraud on the Court)(1973); see also S.E.C. v.
E.S.M. Group, Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 273 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988);
Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 809 F.2d 1016,1021 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987);
Kupferman v. Consolidated Research & Mfg., 459 F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1972).
9011 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2870 (1973).
9 1 1d.
927 JAMES W. MOORE Er AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1160.36 (2d ed. 1993).
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rendered the judgment.93 In reopening Demjanjuk, the Sixth Circuit did not
initiate a new action; the court reopened the 1985 habeas corpus proceeding,
sua sponte.94 Proceeding under the first savings clause of 60(b) is inappropriate
for a court since it would be beyond a court's authority to file its own
independent action. It appears, however, that this was the basis under which
Demjanjuk filed for relief from previous judgments in the district court in April
1988.95
The Sixth Circuit's order of November 19,1993, which vacated the judgment
in the extradition proceeding, referred to the savings clause of 60(b) as authority
for the court's action.96 While the Sixth Circuit did not distinguish the two 60(b)
savings clauses, it would seem from the court's references to fraud on the court
that it was referring to the second savings clause, which pertains to the court's
inherent power to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court. The clause was
added to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1948. The advisory committee
note cited the Supreme Court decision in Hazel-Atlas97 as an illustration of the
relief to be granted by the 60(b)(6) second savings clause.98
C. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.
The Sixth Circuit and Rule 60(b) (Notes of Advisory Committee) both cite
Hazel-Atlas as a case in which the power to grant relief for fraud upon the court
93 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Notes of the Advisory Committee, 1946 amendment.
94 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435 at 1 (6th Cir. June 5,1992)(reopening case on
motion of the court), reprinted in 10 F.3d 338,357 app. (6th Cir. 1993).
95Relief could be granted to Demjanjuk if he demonstrated that the elements of an
independent action applied to his case. The essential elements of an independent action
are:
(1) a judgment which ought not, in equity and good conscience, to be
enforced; (2) a good defense to the alleged cause of action on which thejudgment is founded; (3) fraud, accident, or mistake which prevented
the defendant in the judgment from obtaining the benefit of his defense;
(4) the absence of fault or negligence on the part of the defendant; and
(5) the absence of any adequate remedy at law.
Barrett v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 840 F.2d 1259, 1263 (6th Cir.
1987)(quoting National Surety Co. of New York v. State Bank of Humboldt, 120 F. 593,
599 (8th Cir. 1903)). While not available to the appellate court, the independent action
did exist as a potential remedy for Demjanjuk. Thus, an alternative to the Sixth Circuit
reopening the case existed. Demjanjuk had a proceeding alleging fraud by the Justice
Department pending in the District Court at the time that the Sixth Circuit reopened the
habeas proceeding. See supra note 21.
96 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 356 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295
(1994).
97322 U.S. 238 (1944).
98CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2870 (1973).
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is exercised. 99 Hazel-Atlas had its origins in 1926 when the Hartford-Empire Co.
applied for a patent on a machine that poured glass into molds. After the
company experienced difficulty obtaining the patent, certain officials and
attorneys of Hartford-Empire conspired to write an article praising the
machine, persuaded the president of a glass workers' union to falsely sign it as
its author and had it published. The published article was then submitted to
the patent office, which subsequently granted the patent.100
In 1928, Hartford brought suit in the district court alleging that the
Hazel-Atlas Co. had infringed on its patent. The district court dismissed the
suit. Although the forged article was part of the material submitted to the
district court, it was not emphasized by counsel, and the court did not refer to
it. However, on appeal, Hartford's attorney directed the attention of the circuit
court to the article. The court, quoting from the article, reversed the district
court decision and held that the patent had been infringed. 10 1
From documents produced at a separate antitrust lawsuit against Hartford,
Hazel-Atlas learned that the article relied on by the circuit court was
fraudulent.102 Hazel-Atlas filed a petition in that court for leave to file a
bill-of-review in the district court to set aside the judgment in the patent
infringement case on the basis of fraud. The circuit court decided "that since
the alleged fraud had been practiced on it rather than the district court it would
pass on the issues of fraud itself instead of sending the case to the district
court."103
The court of appeals denied relief, holding that the fraud was not newly
discovered and the decision was not based primarily on the article. The court
also stated that it did not have power to set aside the judgment because the
term in which it was entered had expired.104 The Supreme Court reviewed and
reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court recognized the historic equity
power to grant relief from judgments in cases of after-discovered fraud. The
Court further stated, "Out of deference to the deep-rooted policy in favor of the
repose of judgments entered during past terms, courts of equity have been
cautious in exercising their power over such judgments. 105
The Supreme Court, however, found the equity power to set aside a
judgment for fraud to be fully applicable to the circumstances of Hazel-Atlas.
The Court noted that there was "a deliberately planned and carefully executed
scheme to defraud not only the Patent Office but the Circuit Court of
9 9
"Almost all of the principles that govern a claim of fraud on the court are derivable
from the Hazel-Atlas case." Id. at 249.
10 0Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 240-41 (1944).
10l1d. at 241.
102 d. at 243.
103Id. at 239-40.
1041d. at 243-44.
105Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944).
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Appeals. 106 Also of significance to the Court was the fact that the patent suit
did not concern only private parties but that it affected the public.
[T]ampering with the administration of justice in the manner
indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single
litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and
safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently
be tolerated consistently with the good order of society.
107
The Court also agreed with the circuit court that the case did not have to be
sent back to the district court for a decision on the issue of fraud.108 The
principles of fraud on the court contained in Hazel-Atlas are 1) a deliberate
scheme, 2) perpetrated by an officer of the court, 3) directed at the judicial
machinery, and 4) involving more than an injury to a single litigant. Here the
injury went beyond the plaintiff because the assignment of patents affects the
public interest.
D. Defining Fraud on the Court
The authority of a court to reopen a case when there has been a fraud
perpetrated on the court, as set forth in Hazel-Atlas, is well-established law. The
doctrine is codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)'s second savings
clause. If the court determines that a fraud has been perpetrated on it, the court
can vacate its previous judgment. 109 The court has broad power to consider
whether it has been victimized by a fraud. A court may bring its own motion
to set aside a judgment,110 and there is no time limit for bringing the motion,
even the doctrine of laches will not prevent a hearing on the matter.111
106Id. at 245-46.
107 1d. at 246.
108 1d. at 249.
109Chambers v. Nasco, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132 (1991).
110"Although a party may bring the matter to the attention of the court, this is not
essential, and the court may proceed on its own motion." 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2870 at 250 (1973); see also 7
JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.33. (2d ed. 1993).
111See Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 912 (1949). The court asserted that "when the controversy has been
terminated by a judgment, its freedom from fraud may always be the subject of furtherjudicial inquiry; and the general rule that courts do not set aside their judgments after
the term at which they rendered has no application." Id. at 522. In Root Refining, a Circuit
Court Judge had accepted a bribe related to a judgment in a patent infringement case.
In order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process, the court held that it had the
duty and the power to vacate its own judgment. Id.; see also Bulloch v. United States, 763
F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986). In Bulloch, a motion to set
aside a judgment asserting fraud on the court was brought twenty-five years after the
original judgment denying liability under theFederal Tort Claims Act. The Tenth Circuit
1994]
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
A motion to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court should be made in
the court in which the fraud was allegedly practiced. 112 The power to reopen
a judgment for fraud on the court can be exercised by an appellate court if the
fraud was perpetrated on that court rather than on the trial court.113 The
appropriateness of the appellate court considering the fraud issue, rather than
the trial court, was raised during the Deinjanjuk proceedings. n 4 One of the
briefs submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court, on behalf of attorney Norman
Moscowitz, noted that "the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
conducted both the denaturalization and extradition proceedings. All
evidentiary and discovery matters took place before that court."115 Since the
disputed discovery process did not occur at the appellate level, the district
court, rather than the appellate court, would seem to have been the defrauded
court.
116
decided that the doctrine of laches did not apply but an unexplained delaywould affect
consideration of the finality of the judgment. Id. at 1121.
1127 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 9160.33 (2d ed. 1993).
11311 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2870 (1973); 7 JAMES W. MOORE ETAL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 60.23 (2d ed. 1993).
114 Moscowitz v. Merritt, No. 92-1447 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1993)(petition for a writ of
prohibition or mandamus). Moscowitz maintained that the Sixth Circuit was required
to remand the proceeding to the district court for determination of the fraud issue. Id.
at 13. The brief cited cases in the circuit courts that have held that an investigation of
fraud on the court should be conducted by the trial court, rather than the appellate court.
Id. at 14. Moscowitz further points out that the district court was the proper forum for
determining the fraud issue because the court was familiar with the evidence and
discovery issues involved in the lengthy proceeding. The Special Master who was
appointed to consider the fraud allegations had no familiarity with the fifteen years of
proceedings. Id. at 16; see also Motion to Rescind Order of August 17,1992 Appointing
a Special Master, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435 at 12 (6th Cir. Oct. 28,1992). This
motion made on behalf of George Parker, a Justice Department attorney, asserted that
referring the fraud investigation to the Special Master ignored the district court where
the alleged fraud took place. Id. at 10. "If fraud was practiced, it was in the proceedings
before the district court; nothing additional happened before the Sixth Circuit." Id. at 12.
115Moscowitz, No. 92-1447, at 13 (Mar. 2, 1993).
116Although it could be argued that the alleged fraud in Demjanjuk extended to the
appellate level because the attorneys did not submit the disputed documents to the
appellate court, the crux of the alleged fraud occurred during proceedings before the
district court. This is distinguishable from the facts of Hazel-A tlas where, although the
forged document was part of the record in the district court, the attorneys specifically
drew the attention of the court to the forged document in their appellate argument.
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 247 (1944). Hazel-Atlas
involved a situation in which the existence of fraud was not in dispute, "relevant facts
as to the fraud were agreed upon by the litigants". Id. at 249. In Hazel-Atlas, the Supreme
Court did not decide whether, if the facts relating to the fraud were in dispute, the case
should be remanded to the district court. 322 U.S. at 249, 250 n.5. In Standard Oil Co.,
which established that a district court could reopen on a 60(b) motion without leave of
the appellate court, the Supreme Court stated "the trial court is in a much better position
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In its discussion of fraud on the court, one treatise notes, "[s]ince the power
to vacate a judgment for fraud on the court is so great, and so free from
procedural limitations, it is important to know what kind of conduct falls into
this category."117 Courts have described fraud on the court as a nebulous 18 and
elusive concept which should be interpreted narrowly.119 Professor Moore's
often cited definition is that fraud upon the court should:
[E]mbrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, subvert
the integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of
the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual
manner its im artial task of adjudging cases that are presented for
adjudication.
Professor Moore's definition puts emphasis on the subversion of the court
itself, resulting in the court being unable to carry out its basic function of
adjudicating cases. To constitute a fraud on the court there must be an attack
on the judicial process itself. It is limited to the most egregious conduct that
cannot be exposed by the normal adversarial process during the proceeding. 12 1
Courts have held that to find a fraud on the court, there must be evidence of
a deliberate "unconscionable scheme."122 This scheme would encompass an
to pass upon the issues presented in a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)". Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 19 (1976).
11711 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2870, at 252 (1973).
118 Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d 714, 717 (10th Cir. 1972).
119Great Coastal Express v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 675 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1982). "The federal courts that
have struggled with the definition of 'fraud on the court' in the context of Rule 60(b)
have found such a definition elusive, see, e.g., Toscano v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 930,
933-34 (9th Cir. 1971), but have generally agreed that the concept should be construed
very narrowly." 675 F.2d at 1356.
1207JAMEs W. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1160.33, at 360 (2d ed. 1993);
see also Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Rule
60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that Rule does not limit power of Federal District Court
to set aside judgment for "Fraud Upon the Court", 19 A.L.R. FED. 761 (1974).
12 1Great Coastal, 675 F.2d at 1357.
122 United States v. Parcel of Land and Residence at 18 Oakwood Street, Dorchester,
Mass., 958 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1992)(finding that relief from a judgment for fraud on the
court cannot be granted unless the movant demonstrates an unconscionable scheme to
interfere with the judicial process); Aoude v. Mobil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1116 (1 st Cir.
1989)(fraud on the court occurs where a party has sentiently set in motion some
unconscionable scheme calculated to prevent the court from impartially adjudicating a
matter). In Aoude, the plaintiff filed a complaint relying on a deliberately fabricated
purchase agreement. The court found a fraud on the court in such "brazen conduct". Id.
at 1122. Fraud on the court may also be found where attorneys are in collusion with a
judge to reach a certain disposition in a case. See Browning v. Navarro, 826 F.2d 335,
345-46 (5th Cir. 1987) in which allegations that attorneys and judge colluded to give
favorable jury instructions and to discharge opposing counsel in mid-trial, if proved,
1994]
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egregious, deliberate act such as bribery of a judge or jury.123 Hazel-Atlas
involved the deliberate fabrication of evidence by an attorney, which was
presented directly to the appellate court.
124
Lesser improprieties have not risen to the level of fraud on the court. Perjury
is not a sufficient ground to relieve a party from a judgment alleging fraud on
the court.1 25 Of relevance to the Demjanjuk case, the nondisclosure of material
would establish fraud on the court. Intentional false declarations made to a court by an
attorney may also be fraud on the court. See In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc., 926 F.2d 912
(9th Cir. 1991); Virgin Islands Housing v. David, 823 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1987).
12 3
"Thus 'fraud on the court' is typically confined to the most egregious cases, such
as bribery of a judge or juror, or improper influence exerted on the court by an attorney,
in which the integrity of the court and its ability to function impartially is directly
impinged." Great Coastal, 675 F.2d at 1356; see Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Prods.
Co., 169 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 912 (1949). In Root Refining, the
Third Circuit vacated a judgment in a patent infringement case where the judge in the
proceeding was implicated in bribery related to his decision in the case before him. The
court found this to be a clear circumstance of a fraud being perpetrated on the court.
1 24Not all courts consider the submission of fraudulent documents to warrant relief
under the fraud on the court doctrine, which applies to actions that are directed to the
judicial machinery rather than to another party. The court in Bulloch states, "Fraud on
the court (other than fraud as to jurisdiction) is fraud which is directed to the judicial
machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents." Bulloch
v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986).
"[Clourts confronting the issue have consistently held that perjury or fabricated
evidence are not grounds for relief as 'fraud on the court'." Great Coastal Express v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 675 F.2d
1349,1357 (4th Cir. 1982). Hazel-A tlas did find fraud on the court where a document had
been forged. However, the factor that elevated the forgery to fraud on the court may
have been that the forgery was perpetrated by an attorney, an officer of the court. 11
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2870,
at 255 (1973).
125Hazel-Atlas seems to require something more than perjury to constitute fraud on
the court stating that the case was "not simply a case of a judgment obtained with the
aid of a witness who, on the basis of after-discovered evidence, is believed possibly to
have been guilty of perjury." Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S.
238,245 (1944); see also Quality Technology Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Co., 7 F.3d 234
(6th Cir. 1993)(stating that perjured testimony alone is not sufficient to be fraud upon
the court); Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1988)(finding that subsequently
discovered evidence of perjury by witnesses did not constitute fraud on the court); Great
Coastal Express v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of Am., 675 F.2d 1349, 1357 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1128
(1983)(holding perjured testimony is nota fraud on the court where company witnesses
in trial concerning labor dispute admitted perjury).
Perjury, however, might be a fraud on the court if the attorneys planned the
perjury. During the proceedings before the district court, Demjanjuk alleged that
government witnesses had committed perjury in the denaturalization proceeding.
United States v. Demjanjuk, 103 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1983). The district court found
insufficient evidence of perjury and further stated that to find fraud on the court would
require evidence that officers of the court engineered the perjury. Id. at 6.
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facts has not been found to constitute fraud upon the court.126 The Sixth Circuit
has noted the "well-settled rule that the mere nondisclosure to an adverse party
and to the court of facts pertinent to a controversy before the court does not
add up to 'fraud upon the court' for purposes of vacating a judgment under
Rule 60(b). "127
E. Fraud on the Court in Demjanjuk
The fraud alleged in reopening Demjanjuk was that Justice Department
attorneys, during the denaturalization and extradition proceedings, failed to
disclose information that suggested that a guard other than Demjanjuk may
have been Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka. 128 This information included
statements of two former Treblinka guards who referred to a man named
Marchenko as a guard who operated the Treblinka gas chambers and a partial
list of guards at Treblinka that included the name Marchenko but not
Demjanjuk. 129 The allegation was not that any of the evidence submitted was
12 6Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales, 873 F.2d 869 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 977
(1989)(denying motion to set aside judgment for fraud on the court where asbestos
manufacturer's concealment of time it knew about asbestos hazards was a mere
non-disclosure and not a fraud on the court); Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556 (2d
Cir. 1988)(failure to turn over evidence pertaining to the unreliability of identification
of plaintiff in civil rights action for wrongful arrest was held not to be sufficient to be
fraud on the court); S.E.C. v. ESM Group, 835 F.2d 270,273-274 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1055 (1988)(holding thatattorney's failure to alert other side of possible defenses
is not a fraud on the court); Kerwit Medical Prods. v. N. & H. Instruments, 616 F.2d 833(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that corporation's failure to advise district court of facts in the
corporation's possession that the opposing party could use to form a defense was not
fraud upon the court); Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifer Corp. (In re Coordinated
Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions), 538 F.2d 180,195-96 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977)(holding that defendant did not perpetrate a fraud on
the court by failing to turn over documents which defendant erroneously believed were
covered by the work product rule and finding that there was no evidence of a scheme
to conceal material facts).
127Brown v. County of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169,175 (6th Cir. 1989)(citing Kerwit Medical
Prods. v. N. & H. Instruments, Inc., 616 F.2d 833,937 (5th Cir. 1980)). In Brown the court
held that a party to a settlement in an employment discrimination suit did not have to
tell the opposing party, an employee, that she was mistaken as to the highest level of
pay that she could have received in the settlement. The court pointed out, however, that
the information was in public records accessible to the employee if she had exercised
due diligence. Id. at 175.
12 8Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 340 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295
(1994).
1291d. at 342. The Sixth Circuit listed five protocols which it said contained evidence
that the Justice Department attorneys had negligently failed to turn over to Demjanjuk.
The Fedorenko Protocols (1978) contained statements from the Soviet Union by two
former Treblinka guards who referred to a man named Marchenko as the notoriously
cruel guard who operated the gas chamber. The Danilchenko Protocols (1979) which
included a statement that a "Ivan Demedyuk or Ivan Dem'yanyuk" was a cook at
Treblinka and Marchenko operated the gas chambers. Also, Danilchenko, a guard at
Sobibor, stated that Demjanjuk was a fellow guard at Sobibor. The court noted that
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fraudulently drafted by the Justice Department attorneys in an attempt to
subvert the court, but rather that relevant, possibly exculpatory information
was not turned over to Demjanjuk.
Under prior case law, the failure to disclose relevant information in a civil
case has not been held to constitute a fraud upon the court. Something more
egregious is required such as the deliberate forging of documents by attorneys
in Hazel-Atlas or bribery of a judge. The Special Master, who was appointed by
the Sixth Circuit to conduct the hearings on fraud in Denjanjuk, expanded the
concept of fraud on the court to include nondisclosure during discovery.130 He
did require that the nondisclosure be done with actual intent to defraud, willful
blindness to the truth or a reckless disregard of the truth.131 After expanding
fraud on the court to include the failure to disclose information, the Special
Master concluded that in Demjanjuk, the Justice Department attorneys did not
commit a fraud upon the court.132 In his report submitted to the Sixth Circuit,
the Special Master concluded that only culpable individuals could commit
fraud on the court and the "individuals who composed the team which
prosecuted Mr. Demjanjuk acted in good faith. They did not intend to violate
the Rules or their ethical obligations. They were not reckless. "133
although this statement was inculpatory as to Demjanjuk's presence at Sobibor, it was
exculpatory as to his presence at Treblinka. The Dorofeev Protocols (1980) contained
statements from five Soviets who served at Trawniki, a German training camp for Nazi
guards. One tentatively identified Demjanjuk's photo. Four of the former guards were
unable to identify him. [The Dorofeev information was available to Demjanjuk in 1981.
United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1384-85 (N.D. Ohio 1981)]. The Polish
Main Commission List (1979) listed names of known guards at Treblinka; Ivan
Marchenko appears on the list but Demjanjuk does not. [Demjanjuk learned of the
existence of this list from private sources in 1982. Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d. at 349.] The Otto
Horn Interview Memoranda (1979) in which an investigator and a historian noted that
when a former guard at Treblinka identified Demjanjuk's picture as a Treblinka guard
from a photospread, he had previously seen Demjanjuk's picture in an earlier
photospread. Id. at 342-44.
1301d. at 348.
131Id.
132 1d. at 349. The Special Master, United States District Judge Thomas A. Wiseman,
Jr., of the Middle District of Tennessee, had conducted hearings over a six month period
that included testimony from Justice Department attorneys. He filed his report with the
Sixth Circuit on June 30, 1993. Id. at 339.
133 Report of the Special Master, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435, at 206 (6th Cir.
June 30, 1993). The report continued stating that the Justice Department attorneys "did
not misstate facts or the law as they understood them, and did not make statements in
ignorance while aware of their ignorance. Although they were blinded to what we may
now perceive to be the truth, they were not willfully blind." Id. at 206. The Special Master
noted that the Justice Department attorneys fully cooperated with his investigation
although some attorneys believed the proceedings were "without foundation or
jurisdiction." Id. at 206,207. The recommendation of the Special Master was that the case
of Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky be closed and that no action be taken against the attorneys
who prosecuted Mr. Demjanjuk. Id. at 210.
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The Sixth Circuit was required to accept the findings of fact submitted by
the Special Master unless they were clearly erroneous.134 The court did accept
the Special Master's finding that the Justice Department lawyers did not
deliberately withhold information, which they had a duty to disclose, from
Demjanjuk or the court. 135 The court did not, however, accept the Special
Master's finding that the attorneys were not reckless in regard to their duty to
the court. The Sixth Circuit held that the attorneys "acted with reckless
disregard for the truth and for the government's obligation to take no steps that
prevent an adversary from presenting his case fully and fairly."136 Based on this
determination, the Sixth Circuit, in its order of November, 1993, vacated the
judgment in Demjanjuk's extradition proceedings on the "ground that the
judgments were wrongly procured as a result of prosecutorial misconduct that
constituted fraud on the court".137
The Sixth Circuit's finding of reckless misconduct by the Justice Department
attorneys, who failed to turn documents over to Demjanjuk, was both in
conflict with the conclusion of the Special Master and a new ground for finding
fraud on the court. Fraud on the court has been reserved for circumstances in
which there is a deliberate, intentional scheme to defraud the court. Failure to
disclose information, that is not part of a deliberate scheme, is not the egregious
134 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338,340 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295(1994). The court cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(e)(2) which states that "[in an
action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless
clearly erroneous." The Special Master conducted "extensive" hearings into the fraud
allegations over a period of six months. Id. at 339.
135Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 349.
1361d. at 354. The Sixth Circuit refers to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the
definition of recklessness. "[T]he actor has ... knowledge, or reason to know, of the facts,
but does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risk involved, although a reasonable
man in his position would do so." Id. at 349. The Sixth Circuit applied this definition to
the question of the Justice Department attorneys' conduct during the Demjanjuk
proceedings, finding that they recklessly disregarded the importance of information in
their possession to Demjanjuk's defense. Id. at 354.
137 Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 356. The Justice Department filed a petition for Rehearing
and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435 (6th Cir.
Dec. 30,1993). The Justice Department's petition posed two issues: 1) Whether attorneys
who acted in good faith and without a subjective intent to defraud nevertheless
committed fraud on the court by failing to disclose information that they did not
consider exculpatory, and 2) Whether the panel violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2) in
disregarding the Special Master's findings of fact and in resting its determination that
the government attorneys committed fraud on critical factual errors. The Sixth Circuit
denied the petition for rehearing on February 2, 1994. The Justice Department
subsequently filed a petition for certiori to the Supreme Court. The question presented
was whether attorneys for the government who acted in good faith and without a
subjective intent to defraud nevertheless committed fraud upon the court by failing to
discloseduring respondent's denaturalization and extradition proceedings information
that they did not consider exculpatory. Petition for a Writ of Certiori, Rison v.
Demjanjuk, No. 93-1875 (U.S. May, 1994). The petition was denied by the Supreme
Court. 115 S. Ct. 295 (1995).
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conduct that rises to the level of a fraud on the court, allowing a court to have
the broad power to overturn judgments at any time after their entry.
The reluctance of courts to find failure to disclose information to an opposing
party to be an egregious act stems from the adversarial nature of the United
States justice system. The judicial process is "a vigorously competitive contest
between opposing counsel".138 Construing discovery requests broadly "goes
against the trial lawyers grain".139
In contrast, nondisclosure of material information is viewed differently in a
criminal context. The Second Circuit, considering a motion to set aside a
judgment for fraud on the court based on allegations of nondisclosure, noted
that if the case had been a criminal case, the same nondisclosure done by a
prosecutor would be a ground for attacking the judgment.140 The higher
standard for disclosure of evidence in a criminal proceeding than in a civil
proceeding derives from the Supreme Court holding in Brady v. Maryland.
141
Brady held that the failure of prosecutors to turn-over exculpatory evidence in
a criminal proceeding violates due process, "irrespective of the good faith or
the bad faith of the prosecution."142
All proceedings involving Demjanjuk, including the habeas proceeding
reopened by the Sixth Circuit, have been civil proceedings.143 The fraud on the
court doctrine, contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)'s second
savings clause, has developed in the context of civil proceedings. The Sixth
Circuit noted that the Special Master analyzed fraud on the court in Demjanjuk
in its civil context, without considering Brady, because the Supreme Court has
never extended the holding in Brady to civil actions.14
The Sixth Circuit based its finding of fraud on the court in Demjanjuk on the
belief that the Brady rule should be extended to denaturalization and
extradition actions that are based on proof of criminal activity.145 As applied
to DenJanjuk, the extension of the Brady rule is reasonable. Demjanjuk's
138 USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1107 (1983)('The American system of justice has been built on the premise that
truth, at least the sort of truth that is relevant to legal rights and remedies, is likeliest to
emerge from a vigorously competitive contest between opposing counsel.").
1 3 9 1d.
14OKupferman v. Consolidated Research & Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072, 1080 (2d Cir.
1972).
141373 U.S. 83 (1963).
142 d. at 86.
14 3Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 353 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295
(1994).
1441d.
1451d.; see also, Michael Gaugh, The Strange Case of John Demjanjuk: An argument for a
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extradition was based on allegations that he committed mass murders. Once
extradited to Israel he faced a trial for those crimes which could and did result
in a death sentence. If the United States Justice Department had exculpatory
information, justice would require that the attorneys disclose that information.
It is uncertain, however, whether the nondisclosed material was exculpatory
or would have changed the result of the extradition hearing, which merely
requires probable cause.146 The Supreme Court held in United States v.
Bagley,147 that a conviction will be reversed under the Brady rule only where
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been
different if the nondisclosed information had been available to the defense.148
The evidence considered by the district court in the Demjanjuk extradition
hearing included identifications of Demjanjuk as Ivan the Terrible made by
Treblinka survivors. 149 The Sixth Circuit, reviewing the extradition
proceedings in 1985, referred to the witness statements and, quoting from
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, stated that the court's task in reviewing an
extradition proceeding was "to determine 'whether there was any evidence
warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused
guilty."'150 The Sixth Circuit continued stating "[s] urely the evidence in this case
satisfied this lenient standard".151 Thus disclosure of the disputed information
by the Justice Department at the time of the extradition hearing may not have
had a reasonable probability of changing the court's determination that there
was probable cause to extradite Demjanjuk to Israel.
If the Brady rule were extended to extradition proceedings, failure to disclose
exculpatory information would be a due process violation, not a fraud on the
court. The Brady rule protects against violations of the due process rights of
individuals. The fraud on the court doctrine protects the functioning and the
integrity of the court. The doctrine requires an attack on the judicial process
itself, not merely a fraud between the parties.
146See In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985), the court
states "the Government and the requesting country are not required to show actual guilt,
that the person sought committed the crime. The only requirement is that there be
probable cause to believe the fugitive is guilty" Id. at 563.
147473 U.S. 667 (1985).
148Id. at 682.
149612 F. Supp. at 564.
15ODemjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571,576 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016(1986), vacated, 10 F.3d 338, (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295 (1994)(quoting
Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)).
1511d. The evidence relied on by the Israeli Supreme Court when it overturned
Demjanjuk's conviction included information that was never in the possession of the
United States Justice Department during the proceedings that occurred between 1981
and 1985. This information concerning the identity of Ivan Marchenko as Ivan the
Terrible of Treblinka came out of the Soviet Union in the 1990's. Demjanjuk 10 F.3d at
342.
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In the circumstances of Demjanjuk, the appropriate procedure would have
been to assert a due process violation based on the rationale of the Brady rule,
rather than a fraud on the court. Assertion of a Brady violation is most
frequently done by appeal or filing of a habeas petition. In the extraordinary
circumstances of the Demjanjuk case, where the time for appeal had passed and
Demjanjuk was no longer in the custody of the United States, which would
preclude a habeas filing, Demjanjuk could have attacked the extradition
judgment in an independent action as authorized by the first savings clause of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). At the time that the Sixth Circuit
reopened the 1985 habeas proceeding, an action brought by Demjanjuk,
asserting violation of his due process rights, was pending in the district court.
The proceeding in the district court was stayed after the Sixth Circuit appointed
the Special Master to conduct hearings for the appellate court on the fraud
issue.152
Fraud on the court is a narrow doctrine that includes only egregious,
intentional behavior that strikes at the basic functioning of the judicial process.
Expanding the concept to include an attorney's unintentional failure to disclose
material information is a significant departure from the existing case law with
implications extending to all civil litigation. In the circumstances of Demjanjuk,
rather than expanding the fraud on the court doctrine to include Brady
violations, relief, if appropriate, was available to Demjanjuk by means of an
independent action asserting a due process violation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit denied John Demjanjuk's petition for habeas corpus relief
from an extradition order in 1985. Six years later, on its own motion, the court
reopened the habeas case based on information in news reports. Demjanjuk
had been extradited to Israel and was no longer in the custody of the United
States.
In June 1992 when the Sixth Circuit, sua sponte, reopened the Demjanjuk case,
a proceeding was open in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
based on Demjanjuk's claims that fraud and misconduct by the Justice
Department had deprived him of his constitutional right to due process.
Further, the exculpatory information newly released from the Soviet Union was
being considered by the Supreme Court of Israel, which did acquit Mr.
Demjanjuk. In the circumstances of June 1992, when Mr. Demjanjuk's concerns
were being raised in two other judicial forums, the Sixth Circuit initiated its
own proceeding.
The Sixth Circuit cited authority to reopen Demjanjuk under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 40 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). An
analysis of each indicates that neither of these cited sources gives an appellate
court authority to reopen a case in the circumstances of Demjanjuk. The Sixth
1S2Demjanjuk v. United States, No. 88-0864 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 1993)(Order closing
case subject to reopening by any party).
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Circuit could, however, reopen the case to determine whether a fraud had been
perpetrated on the court.
In reaching its conclusion that a fraud had been perpetrated on the appellate
court during the Demjanjuk proceedings, the Sixth Circuit expanded the
concept of fraud on the court to include circumstances in which a party has
unintentionally failed to disclose material information during prior
proceedings. If the court's holding is followed in future cases, appellate courts
would have the authority to reopen cases, sua sponte, without regard to time,
in a circumstance where there is an allegation that information has not been
disclosed in a prior civil proceeding. This would be a significant expansion of
the court's authority to reopen closed cases based on fraud on the court.
The Sixth Circuit's concern that exculpatory information is disclosed in the
context of extradition proceedings based on proof of crimes has merit. Clearly,
in the Demjanjuk case, a failure of the Justice Department to turn over
documents that were exculpatory, and which would have changed the result
of the extradition hearing, is an extremely serious injustice to Demjanjuk that
would fall within the rationale of the Brady rule. The remedy, however, would
be to assert a Brady violation on appeal, in a habeas proceeding or in an
independent action to attack the judgment on due process grounds, not by
asserting that there is a fraud on the court.
The jurisdiction of an appellate court generally extends to hearing cases on
review brought before it by interested parties. Once the appellate mandate
issues, the jurisdiction of the court ends. The narrow exception for reopening
an appellate mandate where the court has made a procedural or clerical error
is not applicable to the circumstances of Demjanjuk.
The Sixth Circuit's reopening of Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky represents a
significant expansion of an appellate court's authority to reopen a case. The
power of a court to reopen a judgment based on fraud on the court is unfettered
by procedural constraints, it can be done on motion of the court at any time
after issuing the judgment. This power should remain limited to those
circumstances where there is evidence of a deliberate scheme to attack the
judicial process itself, such as bribery of a judge or jury or the intentional
submission of fraudulent documents.
DEBORAH ROY
1994]
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss4/25
